China, on the other hand, insisted on the sovereignty of its nation with respect to internal matters, and argued the hypocrisy of U. criticism in regards to its arms policies, as the U. S.-China relationship relegate them with respect to the squabbles and altercations that defined the uneasiness of the decade. China policy in the decade following the Cold War thus becomes one of no recognisable pattern, alternating between containment and engagement, censure and praise, toughness and compromise, and even armed confrontation and peace. Indeed, for its closing statement, the encyclopaedia asserts that “as the end of the twentieth century approached, Sino- American relations once again only could be characterized as troubled and uncertain, weaker than at any time since rapprochement began.” This is not a mistaken narrative; it is a simplistic one. However, it does contend that to take it for granted, as is often the case during foreign policy debate in the U.
“In the absence of the strategic imperative that the Cold War had supplied, such disagreements loomed larger and could not be resolved with the ambiguous compromises of earlier years,” the Encyclopedia of U. Foreign Relations points out in its entry on China. It serves as a useful base from which to understand the evolution of U. foreign policy and the various approaches that have been tried by the George H. S., will inevitably lead to a misperception of current policy and perhaps influence the pursuit of unsound policy (or, as seems to be the case, undue critique of sound policy).
The uneasy relationship in the early 1990s was accordingly characterised by Chinese distrust and American toughness, with central disputes over the trade imbalance, nuclear proliferation, and human rights.
The conventional view, which is certainly validated to a significant extent, is that the United States found itself freed from self-restraint to criticise China over issues and controversies it had hitherto quelled. President Bill Clinton also initiated the negotiations that would shortly thereafter lead to China’s lauded accession to the World Trade Organisation.
S.-China relations was motivated by what I perceived to be misplaced "controversy" over Obama's China visit in autumn 2009 and his subsequent policy initiatives, which despite all of the public scorn are really no different from those of previous administrations. In a controversial and popularly cited 1999 Foreign Affairs article, Gerald Segal posed the question “Does China matter?
The paper singles out a rarely-articulated coherent logic in the history of U. foreign policy towards China, one that I argue can also predict U. ” in response to growing international attention regarding China’s economic miracle over the preceding decade. In 2007, the Financial Times boldly suggested that “the era of American global dominance is coming to a close” and may be overtaken by China in about twenty years.Regarding Chinese expansionary interests as a threat to U. hegemony, he negated the unifying effects of Clinton’s words during his 1998 China tour by stating that China was not America’s strategic partner, but instead a “strategic competitor.” As Andrei Davydov broadly summarises, “Vice President Cheney, Defense Minister Donald Rumsfeld, and their departments believed that a policy, if not of deterrence, at least of active constraint should be carried out regarding China, which presumed expanding America’s military presence in Asia, increasing political and military assistance to Taiwan, strengthening political relations with countries allied and friendly with the U. Bush retracted his statement later that afternoon during an interview with CNN, subtly returning to the status quo position of Clinton’s presidency.S., and treating China as a potential strategic adversary.” In line with this reorientation in foreign policy, the president’s harshest statement was delivered on 25 April during an impromptu interview on ABC’s Good Morning America, where he affirmed for the first time in U. The message to the PRC, however, remained unsettling.As previously mentioned, these advancements accompanied Clinton’s abandonment of the annual renewal of China’s MFN status as a contingency of China’s human rights record, which had been a strong coercive incentive for reform within the PRC. The 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, which escalated dangerously to a show of arms between the two powers after the U. granted then-Taiwanese President Lee Teng-Hui an entry visa, stands as the most confrontational moment in Sino-Soviet relations since the Cold War. Even more important, however, is the response that the crisis elicited from Clinton’s administration.Although economists and businesses were pleased, the policy infuriated a portion of the U. Notably, the conflict occurred over Taiwan, where U. Although Ross makes clear that Clinton’s bold move to “allow Taiwan’s most senior leader to enter the United States reversed more than twentyfive years of U. diplomatic precedent,” the president’s subsequent actions convey an urgent desire to mend relations, much as President Bush had displayed in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square protests.Nevertheless, he appeared committed throughout the rest of his presidency to the new policy. Notable negotiations of Clinton’s China policy include drawing the terms for China’s admission to the WTO, even while the administration wanted to reduce the nation’s trade deficit with China.Chinese President Jiang Zemin soon visited the White house for the first time in Clinton’s presidency, and the U. He likewise issued permanent normal trade relation status to the PRC.Consider the actual policies of the last three presidencies. Bush, for his part, although inaugurated during the Cold War, continued to be relatively accommodating towards China past 1989. government’s censure and sanctions following the Tiananmen massacre by secretly dispatching the emissaries Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger to China in order to assure the PRC that the U. was still keenly interested in maintaining good relations.Although both Clinton and Bush campaigned under a tough China policy, both presidents quickly found it necessary to conduct an abrupt aboutface in policy as a result of the realities of the bilateral relationship. During his presidency he maintained his support for unconditional MFN status and favoured a policy of engagement with China. Unsurprisingly, the eventual discovery of the mission led to a public uproar; in doing so, however, Bush continued in the tradition of his Cold War predecessors and set the precedent for overall warm relations with China in the post-Cold War period.Proposing a “constructive, cooperative, and candid” relationship with the PRC, Bush made an unprecedented two visits to China within a half-year after September 11, 2001. In June 2004, the White House pressured the Pentagon to cancel Major-General John Allen’s visit to Taiwan.A third summit meeting took place at the Bush family ranch in Texas in 2002, signifying the highest frequency of meetings between the top leaders of the U. That December, as Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao was visiting the U.